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REASONS AS CAUSES IN BAYESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY*
In everyday matters, as well as in law, we allow that someone's reasons can be causes of her actions, and often are. That correct reasoning accords with Bayesian principles is now so widely held in philosophy, psychology, computer science, and elsewhere that the contrary is beginning to seem obtuse, or at best quaint. And that rational agents should learn about the world from energies striking sensory inputs?nerves in people?seems beyond question. Even rats seem to recognize the difference between correlation and causation,1 and accordingly make different inferences from passive observation than from interventions. A few statisticians aside,2 so do most of us.
To square these views with the demands of computability, increasing numbers of psychologists and others have embraced a particular for malization, causal Bayes nets, as an account of human reasoning about and to causal connections.3 Such structures can be used by rational agents, including humans in so far as they are rational, to have degrees of belief in various conceptual contents, which they use to reason to expectations, which are realized or defeated by sensory inputs, which cause them to change their degrees of belief in other contents in accord with Bayes's Rule, or some generalization of it.
How is all of this supposed to be carried out?
I. REPRESENTING CAUSAL STRUCTURES
The causal Bayes net framework adopted by a growing number of psychologists goes like this: Let us assume (for the moment) that the connections and mech anisms needed for computing probabilities according to the Timer ? Switch ?> Lamp <? Power network are somehow implemented in a reasoning agent. Suppose now the agent wishes the lamp to light at 6:00 p.m. Her reasoning to a timer setting presumably goes something like this: "If I set the timer for 6, then the switch will go on at 6. If the power is on at 6, then the lamp will certainly light at 6. The timer setting is independent of whether the power is on at 6. It is very probable that the power will be on at 6. Therefore, if I set the timer for 6, then the light will very probably go on at 6." So she sets the timer to go on at 6:00, and expects the lamp to go on at 6:00. Her reasons include both a desire and a sequence of degrees of belief about consequences of an action. The reasons are causes, not only of her action, but also of the change in her degrees of belief that the switch will go on at 6:00 and that the lamp will go on at 6:00.
As causes, her degree of belief reasons mirror the structure of the causal Bayes net structure she ascribes to the Timer/Switch/Lamp/ Power system, but the variables are now her own degrees of belief in various conceptual contents. The goal that the light go on at 6:00, whether hypothetical or desired, somehow determines the relevant variables for the Causal Bayes Net Ascribed to the World (since there must be a great many such causal networks available to the agent), and the course of reasoning to the conditional forecast:
Degree of belief (Timer = on at 6) W Reasoning to a Forecast are chancy, as they describe some causal process in the brain, which may be subject to various chance fluctuations. Ac cordingly, there are conditional probabilities associated with the di rected graph, and in agreement with the psychological hypothesis that causes are represented as a graphical model, we will assume these condi tional probabilities together determine a joint probability distribution.6
Suppose now that the lamp does not light at 6:00, and the agent sees that it does not light. According to the psychological story, she should then reason using the Causal Bayes Net Ascribed to the World by con ditioning on Lamp = off to compute a new probability that the power The Causal Bayes Net of Reasoning to a Forecast specifies, prior to the agent perceiving at 6:00 that the Lamp is off, the causes of the agent's degree of belief that the Lamp is (or will be) on at 6:00. Those causes are her prior degrees of belief that the Switch is on at 6:00 and her prior degree of belief that the Power is on at 6:00, and more remotely, her prior degree of belief that the Timer is on at 6:00. In other words, perception of the light state is not a cause of degree of belief in the light state from the point of view of this system. Thus, the perception that the Lamp is off is an intervention on her Degree of belief that the Lamp is on, and so the perception that the Lamp is off at 6:00 cannot alter any of her degrees of belief in the other propositions, exactly because it is an The psychological story has a problem: the view that degrees of belief, or changes in them, are causes seems incompatible with Bayesian learning from perception. Perception of the state of an ef fect should lead (by Bayesian updating) to changes in beliefs about the causes, but perception is an exogenous intervention in the stan dard reasoning network, and so breaks the connections between the effect and its causes.
Qualitatively, the agent's reasoning upon perceiving that the lamp is not lit at 6:00 goes something like this: "The lamp is not on, there fore the probability that the power is on is decreased and the prob ability that the switch is on is decreased; because the probability that the switch is on has decreased, the probability that the timer is on is Human perception, we think, is often in part top-down, driven by prior conceptual structure and prior degrees of belief. For a Bayesian agent whose reasons are causes, the problems just discussed suggest that perception that accords or conflicts with a prior degree of belief should have a top-down contribution. In order for sensation to cause our imagined rational agent to form a new degree of belief that the lamp is lit, and to do so in a way that allows a Bayesian updating of the value of the agent's degrees of belief that the switch is on and that the power is on, the new degree of belief that the lamp is lit must be the collaborative, interactive effect of the values of her degree of belief that the switch is on, of her degree of belief that the power is on, and of the sensory input. The sensor input does not itself change the value of Degree of belief (Lamp = on), but rather it changes the degree of belief that the lamp is lit given the values of parents of Degree of belief (Lamp ? on)vs\ the Causal Bayes Net of Reasoning to a Forecast.
For different values of Degree of belief (Power = on) and Degree of belief (Switch = on), the input of sensation will result in different values of Degree of belief (Lamp = on), and so the intervention of sensation will not make the agent's Degree of belief that the Lamp is on independent of her other Degrees of belief.
Since reasoning goes from beliefs about circumstances to fore casts of perceptions, and from perceptual changes in belief to new beliefs about circumstances, it seems that the "reasons are causes" view requires a representation of the causal connections that like wise goes in both directions. It seems that we need, in other words, a cyclic causal graph among degrees of belief, with appropriate asso ciated probabilities. That is certainly possible, but there are two related difficulties: How can updating on evidence occur, and can it be Bayesian? Consider the second difficulty first, in the simplest case in which the variable that is directly influenced by sensory inputs, denote it by S, has a single parent variable, F. The idea is that the value of S causes the value of Yto be updated, which causes the value of S to be updated, and so on, until no more changes result. On the Bayesian perspective, each step in each direction, no matter how implemented in the brain, should result in updating one of the variables conditional on the currently updated value of the other, and we should therefore expect that at equilibrium the joint degree of belief in S and Y together should be the product of their conditional probabilities on each other: for all values of S and F, DOB(S,F) = DOB(S I F)DOB(FI S). But this equation implies that Fand 5are independent!7 Applied to our exam ple, upon learning that the lamp is not lit at 6, the agent's degrees of belief would then be altered in such a way that the degree of belief that the switch is on and the degree of belief that the timer is on have no relation to one another. We should not welcome such a theory.
Not only does a Bayes Rule requirement for updating lead to absurd results in cyclic networks, no correct updating algorithm is known for such systems and certainly no algorithm of the kind that neural systems plausibly implement for acyclic Bayes nets.8 Some other resolution is needed.
IV. DYNAMICS TO THE RESCUE?
The general problem is that the causal direction of influences of degrees of belief must go one way when forecasting, and the reverse difficulty in this from the point of view of an omnipotent Bayesian calculator (the kind philosophy generally assumes), and there is no difficulty in principle from the point of view of a programming sys tem, provided the number of alternative hypotheses is not too large: the degrees of belief on each hypothesis are computed, and averaged with weighting by the degrees of belief in the various hypotheses.
But how a neural system could implement such reasoning, distin guishing between the hypothetical and the all-things-considered non hypothetical degrees of belief, remains to be discovered..
.or not. And that is not the only inadequacy.
The agent must have just the right course of reasoning instantiat ing just the right Dynamic Bayes Net, and that must somehow, mysteriously, be determined by the agent's goals and epistemic cir cumstances at the moment. For example, if the agent is not home at 6:00 p.m. to perceive the state of the lamp, she may follow the forecast to 6:00 p.m. with another forecast from 6:00 p.m. If instead of seeing the state of the lamp, she sees the power is off, she will have a quite different sequence of changes of belief. The correct course of reason ing must somehow be generated on the fly, and we have no account of how that is done. The machine still has its ghost.
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